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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN
A REAPPRAISAL
"Heed Their Rising Voices," headlined
an advertisement in the March 29, 1960
edition of the New York Times1 which
spoke of a Southern "wave of terror"
against those Negro students who were
demonstrating for civil rights. The charges
made in the advertisement2 became the
I See New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 293 (Appendix) (1964).
2 Paragraph three read:
"In Montgomery, Alabama, after students
sang 'My Country, 'Tis of Thee' on the State
Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
from school, and truckloads of police armed
with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Ala-
bama State College Campus. When the entire
student body protested to state authorities
by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was
padlocked in an attempt to starve them into
submission."
Paragraph six read:
"Again and again the Southern violators have
answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with
intimidation and violence. They have bombed
his home almost killing his wife and child.
They have assaulted his person. They have
arrested him seven times-for 'speeding,'
'loitering' and similar 'offenses.' And now
they have charged him with 'perjury'-a
basis of a libel action by L. B. Sullivan,
the head of the Montgomery, Alabama
police department, against the New York
Times Company and four individuals who
allegedly had endorsed the advertisement.
Sullivan, while unnamed in the advertise-
ment, alleged that as supervisor of police
he was libeled by untrue statements which
defamed his police department. The
Alabama Supreme Court upheld a judg-
ment awarding Sullivan $500,000 in
damages.3  However, the United States
Supreme Court, in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,4 reversed, holding that:
constitutional guarantees require . . . a
federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or
not. 5
felony under which they could imprison him
for ten years." Id. at 293 (Appendix).
3 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 657,
144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
4376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5 Supra note 1, at 279-80.
. Historically, there have been two di-
vergent views concerning the privilege of
comment on public officials. 6 The major-
ity view permits conclusory comments
about public officials and matters of public
concern, provided that the underlying facts
upon which such conclusions are based
are true.7 The minority view holds that
all comments upon public officials are pri-
vileged except those made with actual
malice." It should be noted, however,
that under both views the privilege to
comment on public officials extends only
to matters pertaining to their official con-
duct or fitness for office, and not to mat-
ters which pertain solely to their private
life. 9
In Times, the Supreme Court adopted
the minority view but redefined the con-
cept of actual malice. Whereas prior cases
had defined actual malice as evil-minded-
ness or ill will, 10 the Supreme Court defined
it in terms of knowledge and gross negli-
gence." The basis of the Court's decision
was that the first amendment's guarantee
of freedom of speech extends to the law
of defamation. In response to the tradi-
tional argument that libelous statements
6 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 606-10 (1938);
PROSSER, TORTS § 110, at 815 (3d ed. 1964).
See also Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 OHIO ST. L.J.
280 (1954); Noel, Defamation of Public Officers
and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875 (1949).
7 E.g., Kenna v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 250 App.
Div. 625, 295 N.Y. Supp. 219 (1st Dep't
1937); A. S. Abell Co. v. Kirby, 277 Md. 267,
176 A.2d 340 (1962).
8 E.g., Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 146,
97 N.W.2d 719, 725 (1959); Ponder v. Cobb,
257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962).
9 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 6.
10 See, e.g., Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp.,
185 Kan. 61, 340 P.2d 396 (1959).
11 Supra note 1, at 279-80.
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are not protected by the Constitution, Mr.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court,
stated that "libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations.
It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.1'12  The
Court reasoned that the first amendment
was designed to permit citizens to com-
municate their views publicly upon ques-
tions of public import. 3 To subject state-
ments about public officials to liability
unless their truth is proved would lead to
"self-censorship" which "dampens the
vigor and limits the variety of public
debate. 1 4  The Court noted that the
privilege of comment on public officials
is analogous to the absolute privilege en-
joyed by government officials who make
defamatory statements while acting in their
official capacity. 15 "[I]t is as much ...
[a citizen's] duty to criticize as it is the
official's duty to administer." 16
The Court noted that the newspaper
advertisement contained no personal re-
ference to Sullivan. Instead, it merely
attacked generally the Montgomery, Ala-
bama police force. It declared that the
Constitution does not allow an impersonal
attack on governmental operations to be
utilized to establish a libel on an official
responsible for those operations. 1 7
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
1' Supra note 1, at 269.
13 Ibid.
14 Supra note 1, at 279.
15 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see
Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d
359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1964); see generally
Brecht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive
in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1127 (1962).
16Supra note 1, at 282.
17 Supra note 1, at 292.
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Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas,
maintained that in no case should a per-
son be subject to a suit for defamation'8
where his comment pertains to public af-
fairs. He believed that a privilege quali-
fied by malice would do little to prevent
courts and juries from making large awards
against publishers of unpopular views.
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr.
Justice Goldberg also advocated that the
privilege should not be limited to cases
where malice is absent. 9 He stated, how-
ever, that the privilege should only apply
to comments on public officials.'0
Eight months after the decision, the
Supreme Court, in Garrison v. Louisiana,21
applied the Times standard to the law
of criminal libel. In Garrison, the peti-
tioner had been convicted of violating
a Louisiana criminal statute2 2 which pro-
vided that the privilege of discussing
public affairs was defeated (1) where the
defamatory statement was made with
actual malice, whether it be true or false, 2
3
or (2) where the statement was not made
with reasonable belief in its truth. The
Supreme Court found the statute to be
unconstitutional, holding that "truth may
not be the subject of either criminal or
civil sanctions where discussion of public
affairs is concerned," and that "only those
false statements made with the high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity de-
19 Supra note 1, at 293.
" Supra note 1, at 297.
2 0 Supra note 1, at 305.
21 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
22 LA. REV. STAT. tit. 14, 1[ 1, §§ 47-50 (1950).
23 Unlike the civil law of defamation, truth was
often no defense to a charge of criminal defa-
mation. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
67-72 (1964).
manded by Times may be the subject of
either civil or criminal sanctions. '24 The
Court clarified this by stating that the
Times test was not keyed to ordinary or
reasonable care, but rather to actual know-
ledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for
the truth. 25
It is the purpose of this note to examine
the law of defamation in light of the Su-
preme Court decisions in both Times and
Garrison.
Proof of Actual Malice
A federal district court, in Keogh v.
Pearson2 6 recognized that Times elimin-
ated the traditional presumption of malice
for defamatory statements, but questioned
whether any implication of malice could
be drawn from a "vindictive, cruel, and
scandalous statement. ' 27 On the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff was unable to offer any proof
that the defamatory statements were made
with actual malice. The court, however,
denied defendant's motion stating that the
Times case did not foreclose an implica-
tion of malice from the statement itself.
It reasoned that statements could be so
vituperative that it would be a reckless
disregard of the truth for a publisher not
to investigate their truthfulness, 28 and
thus he would be liable even under the
Times rule.
The Keogh decision illuminates an im-
portant point. The public official seeking
recovery for a defamatory article has the
24 Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 23, at 74.
25 Id. at 78, 79.
26 244 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1965).
27 Keogh v. Pearson, 244 F. Supp. 482, 485
(D.D.C. 1965).
28 Id. at 484-85.
burden of proving malice. This burden
may not be too heavy if he seeks recovery
from the writer of the article, since he
may go directly to the writer's sources and
ascertain whether the writer could have
reasonably believed the truth of the state-
ments which he made. On the other hand,
if recovery is sought from a publisher, the
publisher's statement that he merely
printed what was submitted to him, un-
aware of any falsities, may be unimpeach-
able. Therefore, it may be argued that,
unless there can be an implication of
malice from the statement itself, indivi-
duals will often be foreclosed from re-
covering from publishers. However, it
would appear that allowing an implica-
tion of malice from the statement itself
is in conflict with the Times standard that
malice must be proved with "convincing
clarity. '29
Official Conduct
Although the Supreme Court has
granted a qualified privilege to criticize
public officials for their official conduct,
the Court has failed to clearly define
what constitutes official conduct. Gar-
rison, however, appears to indicate that
a broad interpretation will be given this
term. In Garrison, the Court said that:
The New York Times rule is not rendered
inapplicable merely because an official's
private reputation, as well as his public
reputation, is harmed. . . . [A]nything
25 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 285-86 (1964). But see Pape v. Time, Inc.,
354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965), where the court
held that a jury could find that the defendant
had acted with reckless disregard of the truth
when in commenting upon the United States
Civil Rights Commission's annual report, he took
statements contained in the report which alleged
that plaintiff had committed certain wrongful
acts, and stated that he had committed them.
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which might touch on an official's fitness
for office is relevant. Few personal at-
tributes are more germane to fitness for
office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or im-
proper motivation, even though these
characteristics may also affect the official's
private character.30
A case in apparent conflict with this
view is the Kentucky decision of Tucker
v. Kilgore.1 There, plaintiff, a policeman,
was stationed on duty at a meeting of
his fraternity brothers. When the defend-
ant, a non-member, created a disturbance
at the meeting, the plaintiff escorted him
from it. A week later the defendant
published a handbill accusing the fraternity
of discriminatory practices. Plaintiff was
singled out and called a man of "limited
training, no culture, and a professional
moocher . . ." who had illegally used his
authority as a policeman.3 In holding
that these statements were not privileged,
the court asserted that the statements were
not directed at plaintiff's official conduct
as a policeman, but at his fitness or
character as a private individual. 33 It
should be noted that Garrison stated that
"improper motivation" is important in de-
termining an individual's fitness for office.
In Tucker, the handbill's insinuation that
plaintiff had sold out to his fraternity
while on duty appears to be a perfect
example of "improper motivation."
It would appear that a less objection-
able ground for the same holding would
be that the patrolman was not a high
echelon official as envisioned by the
Times case.
3 4
30 Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 23, at 77.
31-Ky.-, 388 S.W.2d 112 (1965).
3
2 Id. at-, 388 S.W.2d at 114.
33 Id. at-, 388 S.W.2d at 116.
34See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85
(1966).
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Public Officials
Recently, in Rosenblatt v. Baer,35 the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to
elaborate upon the issue of who is a pub-
lic official within the meaning of Times
and Garrison. In Rosenblatt, petitioner
had written a newspaper column concern-
ing the new administrators of a publicly
operated ski resort in New Hampshire.
The article pondered how the new direc-
tors of the resort wrought an incredible
increase in income and asked: "What
happened to all the money last year? and
every other year?" 36 Respondent, the
former head of the resort, while unnamed
in the article, alleged defamation. The
respondent recovered on the basis of two
theories: (1) the column cast suspicion
indiscriminately on the small number of
persons comprising the former manage-
ment; and (2) the article was read as re-
ferring specifically to him as the man in
charge of the resort.
Relying on Times and Garrison, the
Supreme Court reversed. The first theory
was rejected since "in the absence of
sufficient evidence that the attack focused
on the plaintiff, an otherwise impersonal
attack on governmental operations can-
not be utilized to establish a libel of those
administering the operations." 31 This was
held to be true even if the plaintiff himself
were not a public official.3 8 The Court,
assuming that respondent was a public
official, rejected the respondent's second
theory. Since the jury had been in-
structed that negligent misstatements of
35383 U.S. 75 (1966).
36 Supra note 34, at 78.
37 Id. at 80.
's Id. at 83; see also Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
241 (1965).
fact would defeat petitioner's privilege;
the Court noted that, under Garrison, the
privilege to discuss public officials is not
defeated by mere negligence, but is de-
feated only by actual knowledge of
falsity or a reckless disregard of the
truth. 39
When Times was decided, the Court
purposefully did not set standards for de-
termining who was a public official.4 0
Facing the question whether respondent,
as a director of a ski resort, was a public
official, the Court rejected the suggestion
that state law should decide who is a pub-
lic official. The privilege, it reasoned, was
constitutional in nature and therefore
should not vary from state to state.4 1 The
Court, although declining to set "precise
lines," stated:
the 'public official' designation applies at
the very least to those among the hierarchy
of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, substantial
responsibility for or control over govern-
mental affairs. . . . Where a position in
government has such apparent importance
that the public has an independent interest
in the qualification and performance of
the person who holds it, beyond the gen-
eral public interest in the qualifications
and performance of all government em-
ployees . . . the New York Times malice
standards apply. .. 42 The employee's
position must be one which would invite
public scrutiny and discussion of the per-
son holding it, entirely apart from the
scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the
particular charges in controversy.43
39Supra note 34, at 84.40New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note
29, at 283, n.23.
41Supra note 34, at 84.
42d. at 85-86.
43Id. at 86-87, n.13.
Since Rosenblatt had been originally
tried before the Times decision, the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the
trial court for determination of the ques-
tions of whether (1) respondent was a
public official under the newly established
standard, and (2) if he was a public of-
ficial, whether the article was written with
actual malice. The Court noted that it
was for the trial court, as a matter of
law, to determine in the first instance
whether the party bringing suit was a pub-
lic official."'
Mr. Justice Black dissented from this
part of the opinion since he believed that
the question of who is a public official is
properly a jury question. 5  In a con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas
voiced his dissatisfaction with the term
"public official" as defined in the majority
opinion. He believed that the term was
artificial and not one by which constitu-
tional standards should be settled.4
6
Because the guidelines enunciated by
Rosenblatt as to who is a public official
are so general, it still remains for future
cases to determine exactly what level of
government employees are public officials.
For example, does a policeman have sub-
stantial responsibility for, or control over,
the conduct of government affairs? Does
the public have an independent interest
in his qualifications? Does this go be-
yond the general public interest in the
qualifications and performance of all gov-
ernment employees? The same questions
may be asked about a deputy fire com-
missioner, a court clerk, an agent for the
44 d. at 87-88.
45 Id. at 96.
451d. at 90.
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, an aide
to a member of Congress and numerous
others.
Extension of the Privilege
Perhaps the most controversial issue
raised by the Times decision is whether
the privilege to discuss public officials
will be expanded to cover public figures
or public issues. The only reference to
this problem in the decision itself is found
in footnote twenty-three which states that
"we have no occasion here to determine
how far down into the lower ranks of
government employees the 'public official'
designation would extend . . . or other-
wise to specify categories of persons who
would or would not be included." 11 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas, in their con-
curring opinions, however, were clearly in
favor of making any discussion of public
affairs privileged.4 8
The earliest judicial expression indicat-
ing that the privilege might be expanded
beyond public officials came in Pauling
v. News Syndicate Co. 49  In this case,
the noted scientist, Dr. Linus Pauling,
47 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note
29, at 283, n.23. There has been some dis-
cussion concerning which public employees
should be considered public officials. See Gilligan
v. King, 48 Misc. 2d 212, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309
(Sup. Ct. 1965); see also Tucker v. Kilgore, -
Ky.-, 388 S.W.2d 112 (1965), where, for pur-
poses of the New York Times standards, police
officers were held to be public officials. But see
Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 242 F. Supp. 390
(N.D. Ga. 1964), afl'd, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.
1965), where it was held that the director of
athletics of a state university was not a public
official.
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note
29, at 297.
49 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 968 (1965).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
brought suit against the New York Daily
News for an allegedly defamatory editorial
concerning Dr. Pauling's attitude toward
communism and nuclear testing. After
holding that it was not error to submit to
the jury the question of whether the article
was defamatory, Judge Friendly con-
tinued:
Although the public official is the
strongest case for the constitutional com-
pulsion of such a privilege, it is question-
able whether in principle the decision can
be so limited. A candidate for public
office would seem an inevitable candidate
for extension. . . . Once that extension was
made, the participant in public debate on
an issue of grave public concern would be
next in line . . .5
As forecast by Pauling, several decisions
have extended the privilege to candidates
for public office.5 1 In Noonan v. Rousse-
lot,52 the court reasoned that a rule dif-
ferentiating between the speech allowed
an incumbent and that allowed a candidate
for his office, would violate the "equal
protection" clause of the federal consti-
tution.5' Similarly, in Pearson v. Fair-
banks Co.,"' it was held that a newspaper
columnist could not recover for an
editorial which referred to him as a "Gar-
bage Man of the Fourth Estate." 5 The
columnist was supporting the cause of a
candidate whom the defendant newspaper
opposed. The court declared that since
the candidate himself could have been
assailed with impunity, it could find no
5,o Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659,
671 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum).
5- See Block v. Benton, 44 Misc. 2d 1053, 255
N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
52 48 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
53 Id. at 821.
5. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2307 (Dec. 22, 1964).
35 Ibid.
"reasonable basis to exempt those who
presume to speak for such candi-
dates .. ." 56
An interesting New York case dealing
with this problem is Gilberg v. Goffi.57 In
Gilberg, a law partner of the mayor of
Mount Vernon alleged that he was de-
famed by defendant's statement that the
mayor's law firm was practicing under
conditions showing a conflict of interest.
The court, relying on Times, granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment
on two grounds. First, the court stated
that where the defendant did not know
of plaintiff's membership in the firm and
the firm was not named, plaintiff failed
to establish that the defamatory statements
pertained to him. The court reasoned on
the basis of the Times case that the im-
personal attack upon the law firm would
not, without specifically identifying the
plaintiff, give him a couse of action.58
It should be noted that under traditional
tort law, if a defamed group is so small
that identification of individual members
thereof reasonably follows, such members
have a cause of action. 9  Second, in
answer to the argument that the Times
decision should not be controlling since it
56 Ibid.
51 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (2d
Dep't 1964), afl'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d
620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1965).
58 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 524-25,
251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Dep't 1964).
59 See Watts-Wagner Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 64 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1945);
Gross v. Cantor, 270 N.Y. 93, 96, 200
N.E. 592, 593 (1936); De Hoyos v. Thornton,
259 App. Div. 1, 3, 18 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23
(3d Dep't 1940); see also Lewis, The Individual
Member's Right to Recover for a Defamation
Leveled at the Group, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 519
(1963).
involved a public official, the court stated
that plaintiff by championing the law firm
"made himself as much a part of the local
political campaign as . . . his partner, the
Mayor." 60
There are at least two cases which have
expressly held that the privilege should ex-
tend to comment on public figures. In
Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville
Times Co.,' former General Edwin A.
Walker sought damages for libel from a
newspaper and a broadcasting station that
had published stories depicting him as
leading a charge of rioters against United
States marshals. These marshals were
attempting peacefully to integrate the Uni-
versity of Mississippi. Admitting that
Walker was not a public official, the court
dismissed the action holding that the
Times doctrine of actual malice applies to
a public man. The court reasoned that:
Public debate cannot be 'uninhibited,
robust and wide open' if the news media
are compelled to stand legally in awe of
error in reporting the words and actions
of persons of national prominence and
influence . . . who are . . .voluntarily
injecting themselves into matters of grave
public concern attempting thereby through
use of their leadership and influence, to
mold public thought and opinion to their
own way of thinking. 2
It would appear from the tenor of the
Walker decision that this court, at least,
might limit the extension of comment upon
public figures to those individuals who
intentionally inject themselves into the
public spotlight. Thus, a person who
"'Supra note 58, at 526, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 831.
"1 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
32Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times
Co., 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky. 1965).
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inadvertently found himself in the news
would still be able to recover defamation
damages without proving actual malice.
In Pauling v. National Review, Inc.,,!:'
a New York decision, the plaintiff, a
widely noted scientist and public speaker,
alleged that he had been defamed by
defendant. An article published in de-
fendant's magazine intimated that plaintiff
was a communist. The court dismissed
the action and held that the Times
rationale covered an individual who had
voluntarily made himself a public figure
by participating in "public discussions of
matters of grave public concern and con-
troversy." 64 The court stressed the fact
that the Times case had removed the
emphasis from the safeguarding of in-
dividual reputation, and placed it on
society's interest in public discussion. The
court believed that the uninhibited debate
policy adopted by the Times case favored
the expansion of the qualified privilege to
criticize public officials to include the
criticism ot a private person who had
"thrust himself into the vortex of the
discussion of a question of pressing pub-
lic concern." 15
Contrasted with these decisions are
those which have refused to make any
extension of the Times doctrine. For
example, courts have refused to apply the
Times rationale in cases where the plain-
tiff was: a former heavyweight boxing
champion; 66 a candidate for public of-
6349 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
64 1d. at 981, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
65 d. at 978, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16.
66 Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 754, 252
N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct.), afl'd, 22 App. Div. 2d
854, 254 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1st Dep't 1964).
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fice; 17 an attorney accused of improperly
influencing a member of Congress; " a
radio and television performer; 19 a former
state governor; and a world-famous
jurist and educator."
These decisions have advanced various
theories for a narrow interpretation of the
Times case. In Clark v. Pearson,7 for
example, a prominent attorney brought
suit alleging that he was defamed by de-
fendant's newspaper column which inferred
that he had attempted to bribe a member
of Congress. A motion for summary
judgment by the defendant was denied.
The court held that, although the basic
philosophy of Times is that every citizen
has a privilege to discuss his government
and public officials freely, the Times case
has no application to attacks upon private
individuals. Therefore, private individuals,
no matter how well known, retain their
full legal remedies.
In Dempsey v. Time, Inc.,73 Jack
Dempsey sued the publishers of Sports
Illustrated. The magazine had printed a
story which stated that Dempsey had won
the heavyweight boxing title forty-five
years earlier by use of "loaded" gloves.
67 Fignole v. Curtis Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp.
595 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
68 Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C.
1965).
6 Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 899, 200
N.E.2d 778, 252 N.Y.S.2d 95, remittitur
granted, 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d 372, 253
N.Y.S.2d 989 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916
(1965).
7i Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co.,-N.H.-,
217 A.2d 193 (1966).
71Harper v. National Review, Inc., 33 U.S.L.
WEEK 2341 (Dec. 22, 1964), afl'd, 24 App.
Div. 2d 736, 263 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1st Dep't 1965).
.2 Supra note 68.
3 Supra note 66.
In Dempsey, the court denied the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss and held that
the Times case was not applicable. The
court noted that, although there might
be a future extension of the Times doc-
trine,
[_the] court is not prepared to hold that
because of the mere fact that one is a
public individual, he may be exposed to
naked libel, unless the classical factors
which serve to abate or mitigate the other-
wise tortious act are also present.74
Perhaps the most surprising rationale
for not enlarging the Times privilege ap-
peared in Fignole v. Curtis Publishing
Co.75 In this case, it was held that re-
marks about a candidate for office were
not privileged. In Times, the Supreme
Court had mentioned that the qualified
privilege to criticize public officials was
analogous to the absolute privilege of pub-
lic officials to make defamatory state-
ments within the scope of their official
capacity. 76  The court in Fignole ap-
parently believed that this "parallel im-
munities" concept was the rationale of
Times and, therefore, held that because a
candidate for office does not have
a privilege to defame a private party,
a private party does not have a privilege
to defame a candidate.
7 7
It would appear that Fignole placed too
much emphasis upon the "parallel im-
munities" concept. This idea seemed
to be little more than an afterthought in
Times where the paramount consideration
appears to have been free and lively dis-
74 Id. at 757, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
-
5 Supra note 67.
75New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 282 (1964).
77Supra note 67, at 597-98.
cussion of public affairs and govern-
mental matters.18
It is apparent that there is extensive
disagreement among the courts as they
struggle to determine the proper scope
of the privilege announced in Times. Since
the standard involved is a constitutional
principle, which should be uniform
throughout the nation,79 it may be ex-
pected that the Supreme Court will
ultimately clearly delineate the scope of
the privilege. Some hint of this future
delineation may be ascertained by an
examination of the considerations which
led the Court to decide the Times case
as it did. Perhaps these underlying con-
siderations are best summed up by the
Court's statement that there is:
[A] profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that . . . [such debate] may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.80
It would appear that the Court's concern
was twofold. First, there should be free
public debate on matters of public im-
portance. Second, disparaging remarks
about government and public officials are
part of our political heritage. In light of
these considerations, the actual holding
of Times appears to be quite narrow since
on its face it only applies to the criticism
of public officials acting in their official
capacity.
If the first amendment is to be given
the broad interpretation apparently fore-
,8 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-85, n.
10 (1966).
7 Cf. id. at 84.
80 Supra note 76, at 270. (Emphasis added.)
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casted by Times, there appears to be no
doubt that the Times doctrine will be ex-
tended to cover public issues as well as
public officials. That it should be so ex-
tended appears also to be beyond doubt.
It would seem to be inconsistent, for
example, to have a rule encouraging the
dissemination of information about a local
water commissioner, but not about a
civil rights leader or a political kingmaker.
It is submitted, however, that in one
limited area of public issues there should
not be a qualified privilege to comment.
If it is recognized that a man has the right
to protect his reputation, it would appear
proper to allow privileged comment only
on those individuals who voluntarily in-
volve themselves in public issues and con-
troversies. By intentionally placing
themselves upon the public stage, these
individuals may be said to have invited
critical discussion of themselves. Con-
versely, the individual who has been
forced inadvertently into the public
spotlight has done nothing to relinquish
his right to his reputation. Therefore, the
individual who is caught in the furor of
public debate through no fault of his own
should maintain the power to redress at-
tacks upon his reputation without in-
curring the burden of proving that the
defendant was motivated by actual malice.
Right of Privacy
Several cases denying extension of the
Times privilege to public figures have
involved New York's right of privacy
law.sl These decisions have held that the
81 See, e.g., Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d
754 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Times standard does not infringe upon
an individual's right to relief for invasions
of his privacy.
By statute in New York an individual is
allowed redress for the unauthorized use
of his name, portrait or picture for adver-
tising or trade purposes.8 '2  The New
York courts have been liberal in allow-
ing recovery for claims based on the use
of a name or picture for the purposes of
advertising a commercial product. On
the other hand, they have been somewhat
restrictive when determining whether a
person's name is used for "purposes of
trade." "I In order to promote the dis-
semination of news, the statute has been
held not to be applicable to the publica-
tion of names which are connected with
items of current news.8 4 Additionally, the
Ct. 1964), afl'd, 23 App. Div. 2d 216, 260
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1st Dep't 1965).
82 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. Section 50
states: "A person, firm or corporation that uses
for advertising purposes, or for the purposes
of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained the
written consent of such person . . . is guilty of a
misdemeanor." Section 51 states: "Any person
whose name, portrait or picture is used . . . for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade
without the written consent . . . first obtained
• . . may maintain an equitable action . . . to
• . . restrain the use thereof; and may also sue
and recover damages ....
The statute was held constitutional in Rhodes
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85
N.E. 1097 (1908), afl'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
83 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App. Div.
431, 434, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (1st Dep't
1951), aft'd, 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485
(1952).
84 Id. at 435, 106 N.Y.S.2d at 557; Koussevitzky
v. Allen, Towne & Health, Inc., 188 Misc. 479,
482, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782 (Sup. Ct.), af0'd,
272 App. Div. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1st Dep't
1947); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc.
776, 781-82, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382, 388 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
right of privacy does not prohibit articles
of legitimate public interest even if the
matters discussed are no longer current. 85
The statute is also generally inapplicable
to educational and informative items
which strictly speaking cannot be classified
as news. 8 6  However, even though the
the item may be newsworthy or of public
interest, the statute will be applicable if
the item is fictionalized."7
It seems that if the first amendment pre-
vents a public official from recovering for
false and defamatory statements not made
with actual malice, it should also pre-
vent him from recovering for fictionalized
statements not made with actual malice.
The constitutional protection should re-
main whether the action is called
defamation or invasion of privacy.
Assuming that a New York court
adopted the position that public figures
have to prove actual malice to recover for
defamatory statements made about them,
could a public figure still recover for an
invasion of his privacy by fictionalized
statements made without malice? The
answer should be no, because "a State
cannot foreclose the exercise of consti-
tutional rights by mere labels." 8s
85 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940);
Molony v. Boy Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 App.
Div. 166, 170, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119, 122 (1st Dep't
1950).
86 Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Health, Inc.,
supra note 84; Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., supra
note 84.
s Supra note 83; Molony v. Boy Comics Pub-
lishers, Inc., supra note 85; Koussevitzky v. Allen,
Towne & Health, Inc., supra note 84; Lahiri v.
Daily Mirror, Inc., supra note 84.
88 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429
(1963).
In Youssoupofl v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 9 the court, when
faced with this argument, said that Times
was limited in effect to comment on pub-
lic officials. Therefore, the court held that
a public-figure plaintiff did not have to
prove actual malice to recover under the
right of privacy statute for a fictionalized
account of his activities. The court went
on to state, however, that it is clear that
the extension of the Times malice standard
to a public figure will have great effect
upon his ability to recover for an invasion
of his privacy.""
Recently, the United States Supreme
Court has ordered reargument of Time,
Inc. v. Hill," a decision which will ascer-
tain the application of New York's privacy
statute in light of the first amendment.
In 1952 respondent Hill had been the
subject of intense publicity as a result of
being held captive with his family by three
escaped convicts. A year later, a novel
entitled The Desperate Hours was written.
The book, while inspired by respondent's
experience, contained some material
which was factually different from that
which actually occurred. Subsequently, a
play and a movie were based upon this
novel. In 1955, Life magazine, published
by petitioner, ran an article about the
play, representing it to be a true-to-life
re-enactment of the experience endured by
the respondent. Respondent brought suit
for invasion of his privacy and recovered
judgment. The appellate division affirmed
and held that by portraying, for trade pur-
" 48 Misc. 2d 700, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ci.
1965).
" id. at 703, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
91 382 U.S. 936 (1965).
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poses, as true the fictionalized account
of respondent's experience, the petitioner
had violated New York's privacy law.9"
On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court," petitioner contended that the
law of invasion of privacy should be
limited by the first amendment in the same
manner as the law of defamation.'
Petitioner argued that its article should be
constitutionally protected because there
was a logical connection between the
person named and the public event,", and
that although respondent was not a public
figure, the first amendment requires that
the press have the privilege to print news-
worthy items. This privilege should not
be defeated by mere fictionalization, but
only where the prerson identified has no
logical connection to the news event
described ", and where the baseless con-
nection was made with actual malice.9 7 It
should be noted that the petitioner in Hill
did not request that the Times standards
be applied to invasion of privacy cases.
Rather, petitioner contended that the
privilege existed when anyone named had
a logical connection to the news event
described even though the event might be
somewhat knowingly fictionalized.''
The Supreme Court did not render a
decision, but asked for reargument on a
number of questions, two of which are
relevant to the present discussion:
'-'Hill v. Hayes, 18 App. Div. 2d 485, 240
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't 1963), aif'd, 15 N.Y.2d
986, 207 N.E.2d 604. 260 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965).
9"Time, Inc. v. Hill, 382 U.S. 936 (1965).
'.4 Brief for Appellant, p. 29, Time, Inc. v. Hill,
supra note 93.
5 Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
.17 Id. at 40.
98 Ibid.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
(3) Does the concept of 'fictionalization'
as used in the charge, the intermediate
appellate decision in this case, and in other
New York cases, require intentional fab-
rication, or reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of statements of fact, as a con-
dition of liability? Would either negligent
or non-negligent misstatements suffice?....
(4) What are the First Amendment
ramifications of the respective answers to
the above questions? !'I
It appears that the Court in Hill is exam-
ining more limited grounds than those
advanced by the petitioner. One of the
questions before the Court will be whether
the fictionalization of a newsworthy item,
if made neither with knowledge nor in
reckless disregard of the truth, is action-
able in light of first amendment guarantees.
Should the Supreme Court hold that such
a fictionalization is privileged, the
standard would apply not only to public
officials but also to public figures and
private individuals. Because the object
of this conjectured privilege would be
to allow the press to print newsworthy
matters without fear of legal sanctions.
the privilege would logically extend to the
law of defamation. If the first amend-
ment prevents legal redress by an invasion
of privacy suit it would also forbid re-
dress by a defamation action. Such a
rule would effectuate an extension of the
Times malice standard to both public
figures and private individuals who were
unfortunate enough to be connected with
a newsworthy event. It may properly be
asked whether the demands of the press
are so great that a private individual
1'Supra note 93. The Court ordered re-
argument of two additional questions. No dis-
cussion is included, however, since they are not
within the scope of this note.
should have to prove malice when, for
example, a newspaper falsely states that
he was involved in the commission of a
crime, or that he refused induction into
the army. It is therefore submitted that
a newsworthy privilege permitting defama-
tory statements about private persons
would unjustly undermine the right of an
individual to protect his reputation.100
Since, however, just as it is the duty of
the citizen to criticize his government,"'
it is the duty of the press to disseminate
the news it would appear that an appro-
priate balancing of the individual's right to
his reputation and the license of the press
could be achieved by making privileged
only those fictionalized statements which
are not defamatory. By these means,
private persons might be subject to some
invasions of their privacy but would main-
tain, in appropriate cases, their action in
defamation.
Conclusion
When L. B. Sullivan was awarded
$500,000 in damages for the advertise-
ment in the New York Times newspaper,
it appeared that Southern segregationists
had a new weapon with which to fight
integrationists. The possibility of many
similarly grotesque awards led many to
predict that the Supreme Court would re-
verse Sullivan's judgment against the New
York Times. When the Supreme Court
did reverse, it did so not on the narrow
grounds available to it, but by declaring a
constitutional principle giving a new
dimension to the first amendment. The
ultimate significance of this decision is yet
to be ascertained. Presently, the Supreme
1"oSupra note 78, at 79.
01 Supra note 76.
Court has sanctioned only the privilege to
discuss public officials. Because many of
the reasons advanced for making privileged
remarks about public officials apply
equally well to debates over public mat-
ters, the scope of the privilege appears
to be predestined to expansion. Besides
defamation, the impact of the Times de-
OBSCENITY-A RE-EVALUATION
"The line dividing the salacious or
pornographic from literature or science
is not straight and unwavering."' In an
effort to install uniformity and stability in
the area of obscenity, various states have
enacted statutes to protect public morals
by discouraging the dissemination of ob-
scene materials. The federal govern-
nent, pursuant to its power to establish
post offices and post roads, 3 has also
enacted obscenity legislation.4
1 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957)
(concurring opinion).
2 State v. Schrup, 229 Iowa 909, 295 N.W. 427
(1940).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Roth v. United
States, supra note 1, at 480.
4 The statute is presently contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1461 (1964). The pertinent provisions are as
follows:
"Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy
or vile article, matter, thing, device, or substance;
and. . ..
Every written or printed card, letter, circular,
book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any
kind giving information, directly or indirectly,
where, or how, or from whom, or by what
means any of such mentioned matters . .
be obtained. . ..
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cision may be seen in the right of privacy
area.
The future course of Times will be
plotted by the Supreme Court, which is
faced with the problem of balancing
society's right to know with the indivi-
dual's right to protect his reputation.
Even in the context of the state and
federal statutes, obscenity remains a vague
and unexplained term. Consequently,
cases have attempted to articulate stand-
ards to enable other courts to deal
effectively with obscenity. In Regina v.
Hicklin5 the Court of the Queens Bench
declared that, in passing on the obscenity
of an item, it was necessary to judge it by
the effect of an isolated passage upon
peculiarly susceptible persons. Thereafter,
in United States v. Kennerly,G Judge
Is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall
not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from
any post office or by any letter carrier.
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the
mailing, carriage in the mails, or delivery of any-
thing declared by this section to be nonmailable
• . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both,
for the first such offense .. "
5 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360. The court found that half
of the book in question was clearly obscene and
condemned the whole book, notwithstanding the
fact that the author had good motives in writing
and circulating the book. He sought to expose
errors and practices of the Roman Catholic
Church and not to distribute the work to preju-
dice good morals. Id. at 371.
6 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
